Scams & Fraud

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India’s slide to 157 in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index, reported by Reporters Without Borders, is not just about global perception. It reflects a deeper shift in how the state is engaging with criticism, especially in the digital space.

Platforms will prioritise compliance over contestation when faced with legal risk deletion becomes the default response

The debate is no longer about whether misinformation or harmful content should be regulated. That question has already been settled—of course it should. The real issue is how that regulation is being designed and enforced.

Earlier, the framework around online content removal was anchored in due process. The Shreya Singhal vs Union of India judgment made it clear that restrictions on speech must follow a defined legal pathway, with transparency and accountability built into the system.

What is now emerging is a more compressed and centralised model. The distinction between advisory and enforceable directive is narrowing. Timelines for compliance are shrinking sharply. And the threat of losing safe harbour protections under Section 79 leaves platforms with little room to question or resist takedown requests.

The practical outcome is predictable: platforms will prioritise compliance over contestation. When faced with legal risk, deletion becomes the default response.

This is where the concern lies. Not necessarily in overt censorship, but in the creation of an ecosystem where speech is quietly filtered before it even has a chance to be debated.

The scope of regulation is also expanding. It is no longer confined to large media organisations. Independent creators, political commentators, and even ordinary users discussing current affairs may now fall under the ambit of “digital news broadcasters.” This raises an obvious question—are we imposing institutional-level compliance on individuals without offering them institutional-level protections?

Then there is the issue of subjectivity. If content can be acted upon for being in “bad taste,” rather than being unlawful, the threshold for intervention becomes unclear. And when thresholds are unclear, enforcement becomes uneven.

The result is what many describe as a chilling effect. Not because speech is always directly suppressed, but because the cost of speaking becomes uncertain. Over time, this uncertainty reshapes behaviour—people say less, question less, and avoid risk.

At the same time, the government’s stated concerns cannot be ignored. Deepfakes, online fraud, and misinformation are genuine threats that require strong intervention. But selective enforcement risks undermining that objective.

Data from the Reuters Institute indicates that social media is now a primary news source for a large segment of Indians. This makes control over digital platforms far more consequential than it was a decade ago.

The Supreme Court of India has already laid down clear principles on free speech and due process. The challenge now is ensuring that evolving regulations remain aligned with those principles.

Because the line between regulation and control is thin—and once crossed, difficult to redraw.

India’s democratic strength has always come from its ability to absorb dissent, not suppress it. The current moment will test whether that tradition can hold.

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